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Nuclear Energy University Programs

FC3: Nuclear Materials Safeguarding and Instrumentation (aka: MPACT)

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Nuclear Materials Safeguarding and Instrumentation Overview

- Background of MPACT Program
- FY 2011 and 2012 elements
- 2012 NEUP Workscopes



NE's Four R&D Objectives:

- 1. Develop Technologies and Other Solutions that Can Improve the Reliability, Sustain the Safety, and Extend the Life of *Current Reactors*
- 2. Develop Improvements in the Affordability of *New Reactors* to Enable Nuclear Energy to Help Meet the Administration's Energy Security and Climate Change Goals


3. Develop Sustainable Nuclear *Fuel Cycles*

4. Understand and Minimize the Risks of Nuclear *Proliferation* and Terrorism






R&D Objective 4











"Safeguards"

- <u>Domestic</u>: State level institutions' measures to enhance nuclear security and accountancy.
 - Threats: Theft, Sabotage
- International: IAEA or Regional Authority's measures to detect/prevent proliferation - state is considered the potential adversary
 - Threats: Diversion, Misuse (neutron theft), Breakout
- Safeguards is often (incorrectly) presumed to mean "International" or IAEA Safeguards



Nuclear Materials Safeguarding and Instrumentation Overview

Mission:

Develop innovative *technologies and analysis tools* to enable nextgeneration nuclear materials management for future U.S. nuclear energy systems

Challenges:

- Regulatory gaps exist in licensing approach for some potential U.S. back-end fuel cycle facilities (storage, disposition, and/or recycling)
- Limitations of accuracy and timeliness of detection (especially in high radiation fields)
- New reactor designs require new nuclear material management approaches (SMRs, Gas-Cooled Reactors, Thorium, etc.)
- Large throughput can present logistical MC&A challenges, and require shutdown for periodic inventory



Grand Challenge

 Develop online, real-time, continuous, accountability instruments and techniques that permit an order of magnitude improvement in the ability to inventory fissile materials in domestic fuel cycle systems, in order to prevent and detect theft, sabotage, or misuse.



Nuclear Materials Safeguarding and Instrumentation Elements

- Advanced Instrumentation (mainly accounting and control technologies)
- Advanced Concepts and Integration (mainly analysis tools)
- Safeguards and Security by Design ("design it in up front, rather than retrofit later")
- Modeling and simulation tools to support all of the above,








FY11 activity to date:

- 256-pixel array installed at LANL (fabricated at NIST-Boulder)
- New reliability tests to establish TRLs
- 169 pixels (66%) producing data from ¹⁵³Gd check source; 92 eV FWHM at 97 keV
- 128-pixel simultaneous multiplex operation
- Failure modes for most remaining pixels understood and can be addressed in next array fabrication

Microcal and HPGe plutonium source data from previous (smaller) 2009 detector array











Electrochemical Sensor for Actinides in Molten Salt

FY11 activities to date:

- Design
- Mechanical testing
- Sensitivity analyses for process monitoring applications





- Current NDA methods: Infer Pu isotopic mass
 - Burnup calculations + "Easy" signatures (e.g. Cs-137, Cm)
 - Pu uncertainty ~10%
- Ideal NDA: Direct measurement of Pu
 - Independent (no operator-declared information)
 - Pu uncertainty <1% → partial defect detection
 - Timely, cost-effective, operationally tolerable
- Potential MC&A applications
 - Spent fuel storage (e.g. shipper-receiver)
 - Head-end of recycling facilities
 - Burnup credit









Neutron Slowing-Down Spectroscopy

- Used for decades in cross-section measurements
- Probes unique resonance structure of fissile (and absorbing) isotopes





Near Real Time Accounting (NRTA) Modeling and Simulation in MBA1 (Head End)



SNF Measurement $(\sigma_r=1\% \text{ and } \sigma_s=1\%)$



NE's R&D Does NOT focus on

- Remote Monitoring
- State-specific Safeguards Implementation
- International Safeguards agreements (CSA,AP)
- Treaty Verification & Arms Control





New technologies and approaches accounting and safeguarding of nuclear materials will be pursued under this research area. This research topic will also pursue key nuclear data and measurement techniques that could improve material accountancy. Specific university research needs for this activity include:

Advanced Instrumentation

New and improved detector systems and sensor materials that can be used to increase the accuracy, reliability, and efficiency of nuclear materials quantification and tracking from the perspective of the operator or state-level regulator. This may include neutron coincidence/anti-coincidence counting, spectroscopic analysis, chemical, calorimetric, or other non-nuclear methods, as well as any other novel methods with potential MC&A benefits.

Advanced Concepts and Integration

Methods for data integration and analysis, include cutting-edge work in multi-variant statistical techniques for process monitoring, risk assessment, plant-wide modeling & simulation directed at the accounting challenges of high-interest fuel cycle processes, including advanced separations processes and used fuel storage. In general, such approaches should help move MC&A from a reactive to a preventative approach



FC-3 Workscope Description (Continued)

Safeguards and Security by Design

Intrinsic design features of processes, facilities, and fuel cycles systems that could increase the security and safeguardability of nuclear energy systems

Nuclear Data Measurements and Technology for MC&A

High-fidelity nuclear data measurements and technology that benefit MC&A effectiveness. Such proposals should include clear sensitivity analyses addressing the benefits of the evaluation of key nuclear parameters such as multiplicity, covariance data, and cross section refinement for isotopes of interest to the nuclear fuel cycle.



Questions

